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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
HOWARD B. CAHOON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
ROBERT P. PELTON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
8976 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE ALLEGED MARRIAGE B E T WE E N 
PLAINTIFF AND MRS. SHAW PROVIDES NO 
BASIS FOR A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST 
THE DEFENDANT. 
Respondent in answer to Point I in Appellant's brief 
has cited several California cases holding that a marriage 
performed in California before a final California divorce 
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decree has been entered is rendered valid by a retroactive 
order made after the marriage and dated back to a time 
prior to the marriage. This is made possible by reason of a 
California statute relied on by Respondent in the instant 
case. We, of course, cannot question these cases. The only 
question which could arise under the California decisions 
would be the constitutionality of such legislation. If, in 
the case now before this Court, the parties had been mar-
ried in California, the Utah court would be bound to fol-
low the California decisions-as the Maryland court did 
in Respondent's cited case of Bannister v. Bannister, 181 
Md. 177, 29 A. 2d 287. There the marriage in question was 
performed in California and a nunc pro tunc decree was 
given under the California statute. 
The same observation must be made with reference 
to the Oregon case In Re Kelley's Estate, 210 Ore. 243, 310 
P. 2d 328. In that case, the Oregon court construed a Wash-
ington marriage rendered questionable by reason of a Wash-
ington nunc pro tunc decree. The State of Washington, as 
the Oregon court pointed out, has adopted the same statute 
as that in effect in California. It would, therefore, seem 
that the Oregon case adds nothing to the California cases 
cited by Respondent. 
The other state decisions relied upon by Respondent 
with the exception of Shippee v. Shippee, 66 A. 2d 77, 95 
N. H. 450, involve the traditional common law nunc pro 
tunc order which differs from the fictional California nunc 
pro tunc order in that the common law order simply con-
forms the record to show what actually happened. It does 
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not change a status. It clarifies a status. In the case of a 
common law nunc pro tunc, the order is in reality not retro-
active at all. It is corrective by nature and its purpooe is 
to conform the record to show the actual facts. In the 
instant case, the nunc pro tunc order did much more than 
this. It was not made to conform the record to what had 
occurred but to have the record show a fiction and to change 
a status by reason of the fiction. 
The only state case which Respondent has cited which 
holds that a retroactive California nunc pro tunc order can 
be given extra territorial effect to validate a marriage per-
formed in another jurisdiction is Shippee v. Shippee, supra. 
In that case, the New Hampshire court construed as valid 
a New York marriage performed at a time when a Cali-
fornia divorce had not been finalized. A nunc pro tunc de-
cree had been filed pursuant to the California statute after 
the performance of the marriage and made retroactive to 
a date prior to the marriage. 
The New Hampshire court, after recognizing that the 
New York marriage depends upon the New York law, held 
that the retroactive California nunc pro tunc order vali-
dated an otherwise invalid marriage. The court strangely, 
we believe, cited as authority decisions based on the nunc 
pro tunc precedents found at common law. These decisions 
were from Colorado and New York. As herein indicated, 
we fail to see an analogy between the common law nunc pro 
tunc order and the retroactive nunc pro tunc order provided 
by the statutes of the States of California and Washington. 
The New Hampshire court in its decision referred to the 
New York case of Merrick v. Merrick, 266 N.Y. 120, 194 N. 
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E. 55 and distinguished that case from the Shippee case. 
The Merrick case is interesting because in it the New York 
court, we believe, took a different view of the effect of a 
nunc pro tunc order than that taken by the New Hampshire 
court. In the Merrick case, the marriage in question was 
performed during a period prohibited by the original de-
cree, which prohibited remarriage for a period of three 
years. Suit was brought for annulment and while the suit 
was pending, a nunc pro tunc decree was obtained antedat-
ing the decree to a date prior to the questioned marriage. 
The New York court held that this could not be done saying: 
"Irregularity in procedure may, of course, be 
corrected by orders nunc pro tunc. Mishkind-Fein-
berg Realty Co. v. Sidorsky, 189 N. Y. 402, 82 N. E. 
448. When a ruling has in fact been made but is 
improperly evidenced by a defective mandate, or by 
no mandate at all, an appropriate and suitable order 
or judgment which manifests the existence of a de-
termination may subsequently be granted to take 
effect as of the date of such determination. It can-
not record a fact as of a prior date ~vhen the fact did 
not then exist. Guarantee Tru~t & Safe Deposit Co. 
v. Philadelphia, Reading & N. E. R. Co., 160 N. Y. 
1, 7, 54 N. E. 575. An order may not be made nunc 
pro tunc which will supply a jurisdictional defect by 
~requiring something to be done which has not been 
done. Stock v. Mann, 255 N. Y. 100, 103, 174 N. E. 
76. 
"The validity of a marriage by respondent with 
appellant in November, 1925, depended upon a prev-
ious modification by the Supreme Court of the de-
cree in Merrick v. Merrick, and no such modification 
had been made. New rights, arising out of a matri-
monial relationship, cannot be created by a judicial 
declaration in 1933 concerning an assumed fact 
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which concededly did not exist in 1925 and the ex-
istence of which was an essential element of a lawful 
marriage." (Emphasis added.) 
We submit that the California and Washington stat-
utes, as construed by the courts in those jurisdictions, pro-
vide for a retroactive order which is fundamentally and 
clearly distinguishable from the common law nunc pro tunc 
order which officially recognizes a status already created 
by a judicial act. The importance of the distinction is read-
ily apparent if it is applied to the case at bar. On June 27, 
1947 when Mrs. Shaw married Respondent, she was not 
divorced. If she had been in fact divorced because of a judi-
cial act but no formal entry had been made, a common law 
nunc pro tunc entry could have been made to conform the 
record to show her true status. In the instant case, no judi-
cial act had been performed, therefore, her status on June 
27, 1947 was clearly established. In that status of an undi-
vorced woman, she did not have the capacity under the Utah 
law to perform a valid marriage. It, therefore, seems clear 
that unless this court is prepared to say that she could 
render her marriage valid by her subsequent acts aided by 
a retroactive order from a court of another state, she is 
still unmarried. If this is so, then it seems Jenkins v. J en-
kins, 107 Utah 239, 153 P. 2d 262, cited in Appellant's brief 
at page 17 is wrong. There the court held that a marriage 
performed before a decree becomes final is void ab initio. 
In Re Miller's and Manufacturers Insurance Company, 106 
N. W. 485, 97 Minn. 98, the court held that a contract "void 
ab initio" is one that never went into effect. 
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One of the cases cited by Respondent in his brief, 
Abramson v. Abramson, 49 F. 2d 501, apparently rules 
contra to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah on this 
question. In that case the Federal District Court for the 
District of Columbia held that the provision of an Illinois 
statute which provides that if a divorced party shall marry 
within a year, said marriage shall be held absolutely void 
does not mean what it says but means that it may be void. 
The Federal court said : 
''Again, the language of the Illinois statute, that, 
if a divorced party shall marry within a year, 'said 
marriage shall be held absolutely void,' may be re-
garded as contemplating a judicial proceeding in 
which it should be so declared, and does not go so 
far as a language of our Code regarding prohibited 
marriages which 'shall be absolutely void ab initio, 
without being so decreed, and their nullity may be 
shown in any collateral proceedings.'" 
The Utah courts as indicated in Appellant's brief have 
clearly held contra to the District Court of Columbia on 
this question as indicated in Jenkins v. Jenkt"ns, supra and 
as indicated in Sanders v. Industrial Commission, 64 Utah 
372, 230 Pac. 1026 and In Re Dalton's Estate, 109 Utah 503, 
167 P. 2d 690. 
POINT II. 
AN ACTION FOR CRIMINAL CONVERSATION 
IS NOT PERMITTED UNDER THE UTAH 
LAW. 
We submit that whether or not Nevada recognizes that 
an action for criminal conversation exists, as pointed out 
by the Respondent in his brief, does not bear upon the ar-
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the effect that the cause of action does not exist in the State 
of Utah. 
Respondent in arguing against Point II of Appellant's 
brief relies on Hatch v. Hatch, 46 Utah 116, 148 Pac. 1096 
(1915) and Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U. S. 62, 
10 Sup. Ct. 792, 34 L. Ed. 481. Mormon Church v. United 
States was decided by the United States Supreme Court in 
1889, nine years before the State of Utah adopted the 
English common law pursuant to Chapter 3, 63-3-1, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953. It is difficult to understand how 
this decision can assist this Court. A decision by the United 
States Supreme Court determining Federal law applicable 
to a territory under an Organic Act is not authority for 
the State Supreme Court to apply to construction of a stat-
ute passed nine years later. It might even be argued that 
the State Legislature of Utah enacted the foregoing statute 
having in mind the decision of the United States Supreme 
Court in Mormon Church v. United States, supra. 
The Hatch case was decided after statehood. N everthe-
less it construed the rights of a wife which arose prior to 
statehood. Because of this, the court was primarily con-
cerned with the same question which concerned the United 
States Supreme Court in the Mormon Church case, supra. 
This concern involved the construction of the Organic Act 
and the acts of the Territorial Assembly. The court ob-
served this when it stated: 
"This is far from asserting that the common 
law of England was intended to be extended over or 
was transplanted into the territory." 
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The court announced what we believe is the rule fol-
lowed in Utah when it said: 
"* * * whenever, in this country, the English 
common law was adopted, it was adopted only so 
far as new conditions and surroundings made it ap-
plicable * * * But nowhere in this country, ex-
cept by positive enactment was the English common 
law fixed and immutable; not even in England." 
After quoting to the same effect from Justice Story, 
the Utah Supreme Court further said: 
"This is familiar doctrine. How often has it 
been applied to this western country to riparian 
rights ; elsewhere to descent where the civil and not 
the English common law was followed; to ancient 
lights and property rights of a feme covert where 
partly the English common law and partly the civil 
law was followed." 
We do not urge that the common law of England is 
immutable or fixed but simply that it was adopted in so 
far as it is not repugnant to or conflict with the laws of 
the United States or inconsistent with our natural and 
physical conditions. 
In this regard we note that the Legislative Assembly 
which in 1898 enacted into law the English common law 
was enacted 30-2-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which pro-
vides in part as follows : 
"A wife may * * * maintain an action 
* * * in her own name * * * There shall 
be no right of recovery by the husband on account 
of personal injury or wrong to his wife * * * " 
(Emphasis added.) 
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The foregoing legislation was in derogation of the 
English common law idea that a wife had no right of ac-
tion; that she was in fact a chattel of her husband. It was 
this archaic idea which prohibited a wife from suing in her 
own name and which gave her husband a property right in 
her person which gave rise to the cause of action for crim-
inal conversation in the first place. Thus, criminal conver-
sation, as pointed out in Appellant's brief was initially con-
sidered a trespass vi et armis. 
We submit if the archaic ideas which gave rise to the 
cause of action no longer exist there is no reason or sound 
policy why the unpopular action should be installed as a 
modern judicial fixture by the Supreme Court of Utah. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY ON THE ISSUE OF PUNITIVE DAM-
AGES AND IN PERMITTING EVIDENCE OF 
WEALTH TO BE INTRODUCED ON THE IS-
SUE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
What has been said in Point II is apropos of Appel-
lant's position stated in Point III. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A 
NEW TRIAL ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF AC-
TION. 
Plaintiff argues that his Motion for a New Trial was 
timely inasmuch as it was filed within the permissive time 
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after the entry of an amended judgment which was pre-
pared by plaintiff's counsel. 
The fact is that at no time until September 5, 1958 
did plaintiff make a Motion for a New Trial on the First 
Cause of Action (R. 76), notwithstanding that a judgment 
was entered on April 17, 1958. Plaintiff argues that the 
judgment entered on April 17, 1958 was not a judgment 
as to the First Cause of Action. The judgment must be read 
and considered as one whole instrument. When so read 
there can be no doubt that it constituted a judgment of no 
cause of action on the First Cause of Action, and that it 
gave notice to that effect to all parties. 
Plaintiff also argues that the Order of the Trial Court 
for a new trial was as to both causes of action. This is 
contrary to the facts as shown by the record. Defendant's 
Motion for a New Trial was directed solely to the Second 
Cause of Action (R. 73). Arguments on the Motion for a 
New Trial were restricted to the Second Cause of Action. 
The Court's order of June 3, 1958 expressly states that 
defendant's Motion for a New Trial is granted (R. 76). The 
only Motion for a New Trial ever made by defendant was 
as to the Second Cause of Action. 
POINT V. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR AT THE SECOND TRIAL IN GIVING IN-
STRUCTION NO. 11. 
Plaintiff's answer, and apparently only answer, to the 
argument made by defendant in Point V of his brief is 
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that defendant failed to make proper exception to Instruc-
tion No. 11. Defendant submits that a reading of the ex-
ceptions as a whole will show that sufficient exception was 
taken to the said Instruction. 
A reading of Instruction No. 11 (R. 124), will show 
that the words "in Utah" were stricken after the instruc-
tions were typed, and the words "outside of Nevada" in-
serted in longhand in place thereof. Although these changes 
were made prior to the time that the jury was instructed 
and prior to the time that the jury retired for deliberation, 
the same were not shown on the copies of the instructions 
given to counsel for the parties, as a result of which some 
confusion resulted in the taking of exceptions. 
In any event, this Court has the discretion, under Rule 
51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to review the error 
contained in this instruction. 
POINT VII. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 22, AND IN 
GIVING INSTRUCTIONS NO. 13 AND NO. 15. 
In answer to the argument made by defendant under 
Point VII of his brief, plaintiff notes that the cases cited 
by defendant are extremely old cases. Defendant concedes 
that the cases are old and that the principles of law stated 
therein are old. However, the said principles constitute 
basic law. 
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A husband is entitled, as one of the rights flowing from 
the marriage, to the services of his wife, including ordinary 
household duties, without compensation to her. So long as 
this right is possessed by the husband, he can recover dam-
ages for loss of services. However, the divorce decree made 
and entered on December 4, 1956 by the Nevada Court in 
Cahoon v. Cahoon, terminated the marriage relationship and 
terminated any right which the plaintiff had to the services 
of his said wife from the date of the entry of that decree. 
After the entry of that decree, plaintiff was no longer en-
titled to the services of his said wife. Likewise, he was 
not entitled to recover any damages for loss of services 
occurring thereafter. One cannot recover damages except 
for the invasion of some legal right. Plaintiff had no legal 
right to the services for which he was awarded damages 
after December 4, 1956. 
Defendant submits that it was not the intention of the 
Utah Supreme Court in the case of Wilson v. Oldroyd, cited 
by plaintiff at page 26 of his brief, to permit the recovery 
of damages without a legal right. Any statement by the 
Court in that case suggesting that damages might be re-
covered for loss of services after the date of a divorce de-
cree is dicta. Moreover, the Court does not state, in its 
opinion in the Oldroyd case, that recovery might be had for 
loss of services after the time of the divorce. 
Whatever the situation may have been in the Oldroyd 
case, the undisputed fact here is that plaintiff's former 
wife was granted a decree of divorce on grounds of extreme 
mental cruelty. This fact is undisputed and the Court can-
not go behind the Nevada decree. 
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POINT VIII. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON THE 
LIFE EXPECTANCY TABLES. 
What has been said in connection with Point VII ap-
plies with equal force to Point VIII. The Trial Court's In-
struction No. 15 (R. 128 on Life Expectancy Tables) per-
mitted the jury to award damages for loss of services and 
other elements of damage from the divorce on December 
4, 1956 for and during the life expectancy of the plaintiff 
and his former spouse, notwithstanding the fact that plain-
tiff has had no legal right to the services of said spouse 
since December 4, 1956. 
POINT IX. 
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ER-
ROR IN THE SECOND TRIAL IN ALLOWING 
AN OFFSET OF $17,000.00 AGAINST ONLY 
THE ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS JUDG-
MENT. 
In answer to the argument made by defendant under 
Point IX of his brief, plaintiff argues that Instruction No. 
12 (R. 126) related to damages for criminal conversation 
and that Instruction No. 13 (R. 126-127) was confined to 
elements of damage for alienation of affections. This is 
not correct. There is no statement contained in the said 
Instruction No. 13 that it relates solely or is restricted to 
the cause of action for alienation of affections. Defendant, 
at all times assumed that Instruction No. 13 related to both 
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causes of action and because of that assumption defendant 
took exception to Instruction No. 13 on the grounds that 
it did not require a diminution of the value of lost services 
by reason of the value of the husband's duty to support. 
As stated under Point IX in defendant's brief, loss of the 
value of services is a proper element of damages in both 
causes of action. Plaintiff recognized this, as shown by 
plaintiff's Requested Instruction A (R. 86). At no time has 
plaintiff argued, either in the proceedings in the Trial 
Court or in its brief, that loss of services is not an element 
of damages in the action for criminal conversation. 
Defendant submits that the instructions permitted the 
jury to find, and that the jury did find, loss of services as 
an element of damages with respect to the cause of action 
for criminal conversation. That being the case, defendant 
was entitled to have the value of lost services reduced by 
the value of the plaintiff's duty to support. The jury fully 
intended that the $17,000.00 determined by them to be the 
value of the duty to support be offset against both awards. 
POINT X. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR IN PERMITTING COU:N"SEL FOR THE 
DEFENDANT TO READ TO THE JURORS 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FROM DEPOSI-
TIONS IN WHICH THE WITNESSES CLAIMED 
THEIR PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF INCRIM-
INATION. 
In answer to the argument made by defendant under 
Point X of his brief, plaintiff states at page 38 of plain-
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tiff's brief, that defendant did not request instructions to 
the effect that no adverse inference could be drawn against 
defendant from the fact that Mrs. Cahoon claimed her privi-
lege or that she refused to answer certain questions. This 
statement is incorrect. In his Requested Instructions 24, 
25, and 26, defendant requested that the jury be charged 
that no finding or inference of guilt could be drawn from the 
fact that Mrs. Cahoon or other witnesses declined to answer 
questions. 
A full consideration of the authorities cited in Defen-
dant's brief will show that the Trial Court committed preju-
dicial error in permitting counsel to read to the jurors 
questions and answers from depositions in which the wit-
nesses claimed their privilege. The authorities cited by 
plaintiff can be readily distinguished. 
POINT XII. 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ER-
ROR IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 20. 
In answer to the argument made by defendant under 
Point XII of Defendant's brief, plaintiff states that the 
requested instruction was given to the jury at the first 
trial. Obviously, the giving of said instruction at the first 
trial could not obviate the error of a failure to give same at 
the second trial. 
Plaintiff also argues that the substance of the requested 
instruction was given to the jury. This argument ignores 
the well established rule that a party is entitled to have 
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his theory of the case presented to the jury in the form of 
an instruction. 
Plaintiff also argues that the substance of the said 
Instruction was labored by the defendant in the evidence 
and in arguments to the jury. This is correct, but the evi-
dence and oral arguments to the jury do not constitute an 
acceptable substitute for an instruction to the jury from 
the Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant has endeavored in the foregoing Reply Brief 
to consider points raised by the Respondent's brief which 
may not have been fully covered in Appellant's brief. No 
effort has been made to reiterate arguments which have 
already been made. With respect to Respondent's cross-
appeal, Appellant submits that no prejudicial error was 
committed by the Trial Court in favor of the Respondent. 
Appellant respectfully submits that the judgment should 
be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY, 
Clifford L. Ashton, 
Leonard J. Lewis, 
Counsel for Appellant. 
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